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Abstract— Making neural networks robust against adversarial
inputs has resulted in an arms race between new defenses
and attacks that break them. The most promising defenses,
adversarially robust training and verifiably robust training, have
limitations that severely restrict their practical applications. The
adversarially robust training only makes the networks robust
against a subclass of attackers (e.g., first-order gradient-based
attacks), leaving it vulnerable to other attacks. In this paper,
we reveal such weaknesses of adversarially robust networks
by developing a new attack based on interval gradients. By
contrast, verifiably robust training provides protection against
any L-p norm-bounded attacker but incurs orders of magnitude
more computational and memory overhead than adversarially
robust training. Therefore, the usage of verifiably robust training
has so far been restricted only to small networks.
In this paper, we propose two novel techniques, stochastic
robust approximation and dynamic mixed training, to drastically
improve the efficiency of verifiably robust training without
sacrificing verified robustness. Our techniques leverage two
critical insights: (1) instead of computing expensive sound over-
approximations of robustness violations over the entire training
set, sound over-approximations over randomly subsampled
training data points are sufficient for efficiently guiding the
robust training process. Sound over-approximation over the
entire training dataset are only required for measuring the
verified robustness of the final network; and (2) We observe that
the test accuracy and verifiable robustness often conflict (i.e.,
increasing one decreases the other) during the training process
after certain training epochs. Therefore, we use a dynamic
loss function to adaptively balance the accuracy and verifiable
robustness of a network for each epoch.
We designed and implemented our techniques as part of
MixTrain and thoroughly evaluated it on six different networks
trained on three popular datasets including MNIST, CIFAR,
and ImageNet-200. Our detailed evaluations show that MixTrain
can achieve up to 95.2% verified robust accuracy against L∞
norm-bounded attackers while taking 15 and 3 times less
training time than state-of-the-art verifiably robust training and
adversarially robust training schemes, respectively. Furthermore,
MixTrain easily scales to larger networks like the one trained on
ImageNet-200 dataset, significantly outperforming the existing
verifiably robust training methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable against
carefully crafted adversarial inputs [1]. Such vulnerabilities
can have potentially fatal consequences especially in security-
critical systems such as autonomous vehicles [2], [3], [4] and
unmanned aircrafts [5], [6], [7], [8]. Unfortunately, most of
the proposed defenses provide no clear security guarantee and
have been consistently broken by increasingly stronger attacks
resulting in an arms race [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
So far, only two principled robust training methods (ad-
versarially robust training and verifiably robust training) have
been found to be robust against a wide range of attacks. How-
ever, both of them suffer from significant limitations severely
restricting their practical applicability. The adversarially robust
training only makes the networks robust against a specific sub-
class of attackers (e.g., known attacks using first-order gradi-
ents), leaving it potentially vulnerable to other attacks. This is
not just a hypothetical concern. In this paper, we demonstrate
a new class of first-order interval gradient attacks that cause
up to 40% increase in attack success rate against state-of-
the-art adversarially robust networks. By contrast, verifiably
robust training provides sound protections against any L-p
norm-bounded attackers but incurs orders of magnitude more
computational and memory overhead than adversarially robust
training. Therefore, the usage of verifiably robust training so
far has mostly been restricted to only small networks.
In this paper, we solve these challenges by designing
MixTrain, a scalable verifiably robust training technique
that can provide strong verifiable robustness against any L-p
norm-bounded attacker with significantly faster training time
than any existing robust (both adversarial and verifiable)
training schemes. Essentially, MixTrain gives the best of both
adversarially and verifiably robust training, i.e., protection
against a strong attacker while still keeping the training
process efficient. Below, we first summarize the main causes
behind the scalability of existing verifiable robust training
schemes and then describe how we address these challenges.
All robust training schemes essentially add a robustness
component to the loss function that provides an estimate
of robustness violations an attacker can potentially induce
for the current state of the network. The robust loss (in
some cases together with regular loss) is then minimized
by searching for the appropriate network weights during
the robust training process. The main distinguishing factor
between adversarially robust and verifiably robust training is
the method used to compute the robust loss during the training
process. Adversarially robust training uses different existing
attacks to get a lower bound on the robustness violations and
therefore can only defend against a specific (or a specific class
of) attack(s) even when the training process achieves low
robust loss value. By contrast, verifiably robust training uses
sound over-approximation methods like symbolic interval
analysis [7], [15], abstract interpretation [16], [17], and robust
optimization techniques [18] to find a sound upper bound
on the robustness violations that can be triggered by an L-p
norm-bounded attacker.
We observe that existing verifiably robust training
techniques suffer from two major limitations. First, during
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each training epoch (i.e., one pass over the training data), the
sound over-approximation methods are run for each training
data point to estimate the robustness violations given the
current set of weights of the network. This is an extremely
computation- and memory-intensive process. Second, the
robust loss and regular loss often conflict during the robust
training process, i.e., decreasing one increases the other (as
shown in Section IV-A). Such conflicts prevent verifiably
robust training from efficiently achieving high test accuracy.
We propose two novel techniques, stochastic robust
approximation and dynamic mixed training, to address the
issues mentioned above to make verifiably robust training
significantly more efficient. First, we observe that sound
over-approximation of robustness violations for each training
data point is not necessary during training to learn a network
with high verifiable robustness. Sound over-approximations
of robustness violations over a randomly selected subset of
the training data can still make the robust training process
converge to a verifiably robust network over all the training
and test data. This approach drastically cuts down the
training overhead. Second, we use a dynamic loss function
to adaptively balance the robust loss and regular loss for
each epoch that can increase both test accuracy and verifiable
robustness simultaneously.
We implemented and thoroughly evaluated MixTrain on
six different neural networks trained on three popular datasets
including MNIST, CIFAR, and ImageNet-200. While our
techniques are generic and can integrate with any sound
over-approximation method, in this paper, we used symbolic
intervals [15] to soundly over-approximate the number of
robustness violations. Our detailed evaluations show that
MixTrain can achieve up to 95.2% verified robust accuracy
against L∞ norm-bounded attackers while taking 15× and
3× less training time than state-of-the-art verifiably robust
training [19] and adversarially robust training schemes [20],
respectively. Furthermore, MixTrain easily scales to larger
networks trained on ImageNet-200 dataset and significantly
outperforms earlier robust training methods. MixTrain also
requires 10× less memory, on average, than existing verifiably
robust training schemes.
Our key contributions are summarized below:
• We present a new first-order interval gradient attack that
causes up to 40% more violations in the state-of-the-art
adversarially robust networks.
• We propose two novel techniques (i.e., stochastic robust
approximation and dynamic mixed training) for making
the verifiably robust training process highly efficient and
effective at minimizing both robust loss and regular loss
simultaneously.
• We implemented our techniques as part of MixTrain and
thoroughly evaluated on six different networks trained
on three popular datasets including MNIST, CIFAR,
and ImageNet-200. MixTrain can achieve up to 95.2%
verified robust accuracy against L∞ norm-bounded
attackers while taking 15× and 3× less training time
than state-of-the-art verifiably and adversarially robust
methods, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide an overview of how robust
training of Neural Networks (NNs) can be formulated
as a robust optimization problem to clearly explain the
challenges behind robust training. We further describe
three different robustness definitions (adversarial [20], [21],
distributional [21], and verifiable robustness [19], [17], [22])
that assume different threat models and summarize different
existing training schemes for making NNs robust under these
definitions and their limitations.
A. Robust Optimization
Robust optimization techniques broadly try to find solutions
that are robust under certain bounded perturbations in different
parameters of the target optimization problem. Training an
NN that is robust to adversarial inputs, created by adding
some bounded perturbations to benign inputs, can also be
represented as a robust optimization problem. Formally, a NN
fθ : Rd → Rk maps d input features to k output features,
with weights θ. Given the input pair (x, y) drawn from the
underlying distribution D, fθ predicts the label of x as yˆ =
argmax{yˆ1,...,yˆk} fθ(x). The correctness, robustness, viola-
tion, and robust accuracy of fθ on (x, y) are defined as follows.
• Correctness: x is classified correctly if yˆ = y, where y
is the true label.
• Robustness: fθ is robust in the robustness region
B(x) around x if ∀x˜ ∈ B(x) fθ always computes
argmaxyˆ fθ(x˜) = y.
• Violation: If ∃x˜ ∈ B(x), such that argmaxyˆ fθ(x˜) 6= y,
x˜ is a violation of the robustness property.
• Robust accuracy: The expected percentage of test sam-
ples over the underlying distribution D that is both
correctly classified and have no violations within the
corresponding robustness region B.
The most common way to define a robustness region
(B(x)) is to use a L∞-ball of radius  around x [1].
However, the definitions presented above also apply to any
arbitrary B including other Lp norm-bounded balls.
The regular NN training process involves the objective
function as shown in Eqn. 1, which optimizes the
weights θ to minimize the expected risk of the loss
value E(x,y)∼D(L(θ, x, y)). The loss function L(θ, x, y) is
used to measure the performance of the network on a specific
input (x, y). A correct prediction results in a very small loss
value while incorrect predictions cause the loss values to
be large. The cross-entropy loss function is commonly used
to train the network. Since the underlying input distribution
D is unknown, the standard Empirical Risk Minimization
(ERM) [23], [24] method uses the empirical distribution D0,
as represented by the training dataset of size N , to minimize
the loss value E(x,y)∼D0(L(θ, x, y)) =
1
N
∑
L(θ, x, y).
Regular Training Obj. min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
(L(θ, x, y)) (1)
Robust Training Obj. min
θ
max
x˜∈B(x)
E
(x,y)∼D
(L(θ, x˜, y)) (2)
By contrast, the robust training of NNs [25], [26], [20] min-
imizes the empirical risk of the largest loss value from B (i.e.,
maximizes robust accuracy). Eqn. 1 and Eqn. 2 show the dif-
ferences between the objective functions of regular and robust
training. Specifically, The NN robust training tries to solve two
related problems as shown by the objective function in Eqn. 2.
• Inner Maximization Problem: Finding x˜ to maximize
the loss value within a robustness region B(x).
• Outer Minimization Problem: Optimizing weights θ to
minimize the empirical maximal loss.
The inner maximization problem of the robust training
procedure is known to be NP-hard [8]. Existing robust
training approaches use either gradient-based attacks or
sound over-approximations to find approximate solutions. The
gradient-based attacks used by adversarially robust training
schemes provide an under-approximation of the optimal
solution, while verifiably robust training uses sound over-
approximation techniques. Both of these training schemes use
standard gradient descent and backpropagation for solving
the outer minimization problem. We describe the details of
each type of robustness, the corresponding threat models, and
training procedures in detail in the rest of this section.
Note that just like the regular training process, robust
training process also uses the empirical distribution D0
represented by the training dataset to compute the solutions
to the inner/outer problems and expect that the solution will
generalize to the underlying distribution. Also, both regular
and robust training, instead of updating the NN weights for
each training data sample separately, in practice, use batch
training to make the training process more computationally
efficient. The training data is split into batches of fixed size
and for each batch of training data points X = {x1, ..., xm}
and labels Y = {y1, ..., ym}, the batch training procedure
computes the loss value and performs back-propagation to
update the weights to minimize the loss value.
B. Adversarial Robustness
Threat model. Besides bounding the perturbations by an
attacker within the robustness region B(x), adversarial
robustness further assumes that the attacker is restricted to
a specific subclass of attacks, i.e., first-order gradient-guided
attackers. Recent works have trained NNs to be robust against
different existing first-order attacks like Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) and Carlini-Wagner (CW) [27], [28], [29],
[30]. Unfortunately, all of these defenses have been shown
to be easily broken by slightly changing the corresponding
attack exposing the inherent limitations of the underlying
robust training schemes [31], [32].
To avoid such issues, Madry et al. [20] recently proposed
a defense scheme against all first-order adversaries where the
attacker is assumed to use first order gradients of the NN in
arbitrary ways but not use any higher-order gradients. Madry
et al. justified the choice of their threat model by arguing
that computational complexity of higher-order gradients is
not clearly understood and thus the memory and computation
cost may be significantly higher than computing first-order
gradients. We summarize their robust training scheme below.
Adversarially robust training. The state-of-the-art
adversarially robust training scheme of Madry et al. [20]
relies on first-order gradient-guided PGD attacks to search
for the largest loss value within B. In fact, given input pair
(x, y), first-order attacks to estimate the lower bound of the
inner maximization problem:
L(Attack(x), y) ≤ max
x˜∈B(x)
L(fθ(x˜), y) (3)
Specifically, for a batch of training data (X , Y ), the
training process first conducts PGD perturbations with a
random starting point to generate a perturbed training batch
X ′ = PGD(X), representing the estimated solution to the
inner problem maxx˜∈B(x) L(fθ(x˜), y). The corresponding
losses of X ′ and labels Y are then used to solve the outer
minimization problem (Eqn. 2) using gradient descent by
minimizing the function shown below.
min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
L(fθ(PGD(x)), y) (4)
Madry et al.’s scheme is relatively efficient (though more
expensive than regular training) and has been shown to
be robust against known first-order attacks like Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) [27], Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [28], and Carlini-Wagner (CW) attacks [14]. In this
paper, we define the Estimated Robust Accuracy (ERA) of
a network as the percentage of test samples that are robust
against known first-order attacks like PGD.
Limitations. Besides ignoring attacks using second- and
higher-order derivatives, Madry et al.’s scheme also assumes
that starting a first-order attack like PGD from a random start-
ing point for each batch can provide a good solution to the in-
ner maximization problem. To support this claim, they present
experimental results from 100, 000 random starting points
showing that all solutions to the inner maximization problem
found by PGD in these cases are distinct local optimas, yet
they have very similar loss values. Due to the concentrated
distribution of the loss values, Madry et al. concluded that
the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attacker with a random
start can be thought as the “ultimate” first-order adversary and
thus can provide a good solutions to the inner maximization
problem that can be achieved by arbitrary first-order attackers.
However, as NNs are non-convex, the solutions to the inner
maximization problem found by a first-order attack like PGD
can vary widely based on the starting point. Moreover, the
non-convex nature of the NNs often make the good starting
points to be very hard to find using random sampling used in
Madry et al.’s experiment described earlier. In Section III-A),
we present a new attack that uses first-order interval gradients
to carefully good promising starting points for existing attacks
like PGD. We show in Section III-A that the estimated adver-
sarial robust loss value L(fθ(PGD(x)), y) using PGD tend to
be much smaller than the true maximal loss, as we will show
in Section III-A. Moreover, we find that adapting the adver-
sarially robust training process to use interval attacks converge
significantly slowly than the corresponding PGD version. This
result exposes the fundamental limitation of such training
methods. By contrast, our verifiably robust training scheme are
more efficient and provides significantly stronger guarantees
against stronger attackers than adversarially robust training.
C. Distributional Robustness
Threat model. Instead of defining the robustness region B in
terms of L-p norms, distributional robustness allows the adver-
sary to draw any data samples (i.e., images) from a distribution
P as long as it is within a bounded Wasserstein distance of ρ
from the actual underlying data distribution D [21]. Formally,
the robustness region is P = {P : Wc(P,D) ≤ ρ}. There is
no other restriction on the information that the adversary has
access to or the types of attack the adversary can perform.
Training scheme. Unfortunately, solving the inner
maximization problem involving the Wasserstein distance is
intractable. Therefore, To make the problem tractable, Sinha
et al. [21] used the Lagrangian relaxation to reformulate the
distribution distance bound into a L2 distance penalty. Since
D is unknown, the authors used the empirical distribution D0
for computing the solutions.
Limitations. The distributional robust training provides an
useful upper bound on the expectation of the loss function only
when the bounded robustness region B is very small (e.g.,
||||2 ≤ 0.1). Such training become significantly ineffective as
the bound becomes larger (e.g., ||||∞ ≤ 0.1). Moreover, the
training methods require the NNs to have smooth activation
functions like ELU and thus cannot support any networks
using ReLUs, one of the most popular activation functions.
D. Verifiable Robustness
Threat model. Unlike the other two robustness definitions,
verifiable robustness can provide protection against attackers
with unlimited computation/information as long as the
perturbations are limited within a robustness region B(x).
The attacker can use any information, draw input from
arbitrary distributions, and launch unknown attacks.
Verifiably robust training. To capture the capabilities of
unbounded attackers, sound analysis techniques are used to
over-estimate the solutions to the inner maximization problem
for a given the robustness region B. The soundness ensures
that no successful attack can be constructed within its B
input range if the analysis found no violations. Existing sound
analysis techniques include convex polytope [18], symbolic
intervals [7], [15], abstract domains [16], Lagrangian
relaxation [33] and relaxation with Lipschitz constant [34].
Essentially, all of these perform a sound transformation T
from the input to the output of the network fθ. Formally,
given input x ∈ X and allowable input range B(x), the
transformation T is sound if following condition is true:
{fθ(x˜)|x˜ ∈ B(x),∀x ∈ X} ⊆ T(X) (5)
The verifiable robustness for an input pair (x, y) is defined
as argmaxj∈{1,...,k} d(x) = y. It indicates that the output
for class y for input x will always be predicted as the largest
among all outputs estimated by sound over-approximation
T(x). Here, d(x) denotes the worst-case outputs produced
by T(x), which corresponds to the estimated worst regular
loss value L(d(x), y) within input range B(x). Such sound
over-approximations provide the upper bound of the inner
maximization problem:
max
x˜∈B(x)
L(fθ(x˜), y) ≤ L(d(x), y) (6)
For a batch of training data points (X , Y ), the training
process first computes the verifiable robust loss L(d(X), Y )
using sound over-approximation methods. Therefore, the
outer minimization problem in Eqn. 2 becomes:
min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
L(d(x), y) (7)
Such training increases the Verified Robust Accuracy (VRA)
of a NN, the percentage of test samples within B that
can be verified using sound over-approximation to have no
violations. The VRA provides a sound lower bound on the
robust accuracy of a network as test samples might fail to
verify due to false positives generated by over-approximation.
Limitations. While verifiably robust training schemes
tend to achieve both high ERA and high VRA, existing
training schemes are prohibitively expensive both in terms
of computations and required memory, being hundreds
of times slower than normal training methods. Moreover,
due to the over-approximated violations, existing training
schemes also sacrifice test accuracy to improve robustness.
Such problems prevent these methods to be applied to
real-world applications. In this paper, we specifically focus on
verifiably robust training and propose two novel techniques
that significantly cuts down the overhead of verifiably robust
training while still achieving high accuracy and VRA.
III. INTERVAL ATTACK
In this section, we describe a novel interval-gradient-based
attack against the state-of-the-art adversarially robust neural
networks trained using Madry et al.’s [20] method. Their
technique uses PGD attacks to find a maximal loss value for
the inner maximization problem shown in Eqn. 2. As PGD is
a first-order gradient-guided attack and the neural networks
are non-convex, the maximal value found by the PGD might
not be the optimal solution (i.e., the maximum) to the inner
maximization problem. However, Madry et al. claimed that
PGD attacks are the “ultimate” first-order attacks, i.e., no
other first-order attack will be able to significantly improve
over the solutions found by PGD. In order to support their
claim, Madry et al. performed 100, 000 iterations of the PGD
attack from random starting points within bounded L∞-balls
of test inputs and showed that all the solutions found by these
instances are distinct local optimas with similar loss values.
Therefore, they speculated that these distinct local optimas
found by PGD attacks are very close to the best solution that
can be found by any first-order attacker.
In this paper, we demonstrate that Madry et al.’s assump-
tion that the solutions found by the PGD attacks cannot be
improved by only using first-order information to be flawed.
Our first-order interval-gradient-based attack can effectively
find good starting points for PGD attacks that significantly im-
proves the attack success rate (up to 40% more) as opposed to
starting from random points. Our experiments found that such
starting points are not distributed evenly due to the non-convex
nature of the neural networks and therefore are very hard
to find using random sampling. Our attack demonstrates the
pitfalls behind making assumptions about a neural network’s
behavior, given its non-convexity, based on random sampling.
We further demonstrate that extending adversarial training
method to use the interval attacks struggles to converge well
(as shown in Figure 2) even after training for a extremely long
time (12 hours) for a very small MNIST networks. We believe
that this shows the fundamental limitations of adversarially
robust training when used together with advanced attacks.
By contrast, our verifiably robust training scheme does not
make any such assumptions about the attacker and is more
efficient than adversarially robust raining schemes as shown
in Section V.
Intuition behind interval attacks. Due to the non-convexity
of the neural networks, existing first-order gradient-guided at-
tacks like PGD and CW often get stuck at a local optima close
to the starting point. Therefore, the loss value estimated by
these attacks to solve the inner maximization problem might be
significantly less than the true optimal value. Madry et al. try
to mitigate such effects using a simple heuristic, i.e., picking
a random starting point within the L∞ ball for each instance
of the attack. However, local optima and true optimal values
of the inner maximization problem can be very unevenly
distributed, the chances of reaching a better solution by simply
randomly restarting the gradient-guided attacks is very low.
In this paper, we mitigate this problem, by using interval
gradients instead of regular gradient to identify regions
containing good starting points. Unlike regular gradients that
summarize a function’s behavior at a point, interval gradients
are computed over a region and thus have a broader view of
the functional landscape. Compared to more computationally
expensive information like second-order gradients, the
interval gradient is still cheap to compute and relies only on
first-order information. Figure 1a and Figure 1b illustrate how
interval gradient can identify the regions containing potential
violations that regular point-gradient-based search from a
random starting point cannot find.
Our experiments confirm that the interval-gradient-guided
search methods are more likely to find regions containing
good starting points than random starts. However, interval-
gradient-guided search cannot directly identify concrete attack
inputs. We address this by first using interval gradients to
find input regions containing good starting points and then
launch existing attacks like PGD within that region to find
concrete violations.
Interval gradient (gI ). Sound over-approximation techniques
like symbolic interval analysis provides the lower and upper
bounds (in terms of two parallel linear equations over
symbolic inputs) of a neural network’s output for a bounded
input region [7]. We define the interval gradient to be equal
to the slope of these parallel lines. In this paper, we use
symbolic linear relaxation, which combines symbolic interval
analysis with linear relaxation to provide tighter output
bounds [15]. Essentially, such analysis produces two parallel
linear equations (Equp and Eqlow as shown in Figure 1) to
tightly bound the output of each neuron. For example, let
us assume symbolic input relaxation provides the bounds of
a neural network’s output as [2x, 2x + 3] after propagating
input range x = [0, 1] through the network. Here, the interval
gradient will be d([2x,2x+3])dx = 2.
l1
l2
Violations
Starting point x
g = 0
(a) PGD attack
gI
l2
Starting point x
x − ε0 x + ε0
l1
Equp
Eqlow
(b) Interval attack
Fig. 1: The difference between regular gradient and interval
gradient. Figure (a) illustrates that PGD attacks using regular
gradients might get stuck at l1. Figure (b) shows that interval
gradient gI over an input region B0 allows us to avoid such
problem and successfully locate the violation l2. Here Equp and
Eqlow are the symbolic upper and lower bounds of the output
as found by symbolic linear relaxation.
Interval attack details. Algorithm 1 shows how we imple-
mented the interval attack. The key challenge is to find a
suitable value of 0 representing the input region over which
the interval gradient will be computed (Line 3 to Line 7) at
each iteration of interval-gradient-based search. If 0 is too
large, the symbolic interval analysis will introduce large over-
estimation error leading to the wrong direction. On the other
hand, if 0 is too small, the information from the surrounding
area might not be enough to make a clever update. Therefore,
we dynamically adjust the size of 0 during the attack.
After a bounded number of iterations with interval
gradients, we use PGD attack with a starting point from
the region identified by the interval-gradient-based search to
locate a concrete violation as shown in Line 13.
A. Effectiveness of Interval Attacks
We implemented symbolic interval analysis [15] and
interval attacks on top of Tensorflow 1.9.01. All of our
experiments are ran on a GeForce GTX 1080 Ti. We evaluated
the interval attack on two neural networks MNIST FC1 and
MNIST FC2. Both networks are trained to be adversarially
robust using the Madry et al.’s technique [20]. For solving
the inner maximization problem while robust training, we
used PGD attacks with 40 iterations and 0.01 as step size.
We define the robustness region, B(x), to be bounded by
L∞ norm with  = 0.3 over normalized inputs. The network
details are shown in Table I. We use the 1,024 randomly
selected images from the MNIST test set to measure accuracy
1https://www.tensorflow.org/
Algorithm 1 Interval Attack
Inputs: x ← target input,  ← attack budget
Parameters: t: iterations, α: step size, 0: starting point,
p: input region step size
Output: x′ ← perturbed x
1: x′ = x
2: for i← 1 to t do
3: ′0 = 0
4: // Find smallest 0 that might have violations
5: while argmax(d0(x)) == y do
6: ′0 = 
′
0 ∗ p
7: if ′0 >= /2 then break // Prevent 0 being too large
8: gI = ∇xL(d0(x′), y) // From symbolic interval analysis
9: x′ = x′ + αgI
10: // Bound x′ within allowable input ranges
11: x′ = clip(x′, x− , x+ )
12: if argmax(fθ(x′)) 6= y then return x′
13: PGD Attack(x′)
14: return x′
and robustness. MNIST FC1 contains two hidden layers each
with 512 hidden nodes. and achieves 98.0% test accuracy.
Similarly, MNIST FC2 contains five hidden layers each with
2,048 hidden nodes and achieve 98.8% test accuracy.
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Fig. 2: Adversarially robust training using the interval attack
does not converge well compared to using PGD attacks, given
12 hours of training time on the MNIST Small network with
L∞ ≤ 0.3. The estimated robust accuracy of training using PGD
attacks [20] quickly converges to 89.3% ERA, while training
using the interval attack struggles to converge.
Attack effectiveness. The interval attack is very effective
at finding violations in both of our tested networks that are
relatively robust against PGD and CW attacks with less than
35% success rate,. We compared the strength of the interval
attack against the state-of-the-art PGD and CW attacks given
the same amount of attack time, as shown in Table I. The
interval attack is able to achieve up to 40% increase in the
attack success rate of PGD and CW. The iterations for PGD
and CW are around 7,200 for MNIST FC1 and 42,000 for
MNIST FC2. We ran the interval attack for 20 iterations
against MNIST FC1 and MNIST FC2, which took 53.9
seconds and 466.5 seconds respectively.
Our results show that using only first-order gradient
information, the interval attack can find significantly
more robustness violations than PGD and CW attacks in
adversarially robust networks.
Inefficiency of adversarially robust training with interval
attacks. One obvious way of increasing the robustness
of adversarially robust trained networks against interval-
based attacks is to use such attacks to solve the inner
maximization problem during training. However, due to the
highly uneven distribution of the loss values (as shown in
Figure 3), robust training with interval attacks often struggle
to converge. To demonstrate that, we evaluated adversarial
robust training using interval attacks on MNIST Small
network for L∞ ≤ 0.3. As shown in the Figure 2, even
after 12 hours training time for such a small network, the
interval-based adversarially robust training does not converge
as well as its PGD-based counterpart. Therefore, instead of
improving the adversarially robust training schemes, we focus
on scaling verifiably robust training, which can also defend
against stronger attackers. In Section V-B, we show that
MixTrain can achieve similar test accuracy with up to 95.2%
more verified robust accuracy than existing adversarially
robust training schemes, using 3× less training time.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we discuss the design of MixTrain in
detail. MixTrain is a generic defense that can work with any
verifiably robust training methods to efficiently and scalably
train robust neural networks. Specifically, we propose two key
techniques, Stochastic Robust Approximation and Dynamic
Mixed Training. Stochastic robust approximation significantly
cuts down the overhead of sound over-approximations of
violations with stochastic sampling. Similarly, dynamic mixed
training helps the trained network to simultaneously achieve
both high VRA and high test accuracy.
A. Motivation
Our design decisions for MixTrain are based on the
observation that existing verifiably robust training methods
suffer from two main scalability issues described below.
High computation and memory cost. Verifiably robust train-
ing uses sound over-approximation techniques like symbolic
interval analysis, abstract interpretation, convex polytope etc.
to solve the inner maximization problem as mentioned in
Section II. All existing verifiably robust training schemes com-
pute sound over-approximations of the network robustness for
all training samples. This causes significant overhead both in
terms of computation and memory. The state-of-the-art sound
over-approximation techniques, despite impressive progress,
are still hundreds of times slower and require thousands of
times more memory than the regular forward propagation in
a neural network [18], [19], [34], [15]. Most of the com-
putational overhead in sound over-approximation techniques
results from computing the precise bounds on the outputs of
different hidden nodes of a network. Similarly, the amount of
memory required for sound over-approximation increases sig-
nificantly with the number of hidden nodes in a network. For
instance, for verifiably robust training of a CIFAR residual net-
work with around 32,000 hidden nodes requires up to around
300GB of memory while the regular training only needs 7MB.
Conflict between verifiable robustness and accuracy. We
observe that verifiable robustness and test accuracy start
conflicting after the initial training epochs, i.e., increasing
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Fig. 3: Distributions of the loss values from robustness violations found by PGD attacks (blue), CW attacks (green), and interval
attacks (red) with 100,000 random starts within the allowable input range B(x). The loss values found by CW and PGD attacks
are very small and concentrated. However, interval attacks show there are still many distinct violations with much larger loss values.
Network # Hidden units # Parameters ACC (%) Attack success rate (%)PGD CW Interval attack
MNIST FC1 1,024 668,672 98.1 39.2 42.2 (1.08×) 56.2 (1.43×)
MNIST FC2 10,240 18,403,328 98.8 34.4 32.2 (0.94×) 44.4 (1.38×)
TABLE I: Attack success rates of PGD, CW and interval attacks ( = 0.3) on MNIST FC1 and MNIST FC2 networks. The
highest success rates are in bold. Both networks are adversarially robust trained using PGD attacks with  = 0.3 [20].
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Fig. 4: The conflicting changes in regular loss and verifiable
robust loss while training two CIFAR Small networks. The
left one is regular training after x epochs of verifiably robust
training (Wong et al.’s method [19]) and the right one is
verifiably robust training after x epochs of regular training.
one often decreases the other. Figure 4a and Figure 4b clearly
shows this effect. For the first experiment, we start with a
CIFAR Small network pre-trained for 60 epochs with Wong
et al.’s verifiably robust training method [19]. When we
further trained this network with regular training, as shown
in Figure 4a, the normal loss decreases (i.e., the test accuracy
improves) but the verifiable robust loss increases (i.e., the
VRA decreases). For the second experiment, we started
with CIFAR Small network pre-trained with regular training
after 60 epochs. Training this network with verifiable robust
training increases VRA but decreases test accuracy as shown
by the loss values in Figure 4b. The results demonstrate that
improving verifiable robustness and test accuracy becomes
conflicting after the initial training epochs.
B. Stochastic Robust Approximation
We propose stochastic robust approximation to reduce
the computational and memory cost of the verifiable robust
training process. The key insight behind our approach
we should try to minimize the usage of expensive sound
over-approximation methods without affecting the verified
robustness of the final network. We observe that one does not
actually need sound over-approximations of robustness viola-
tions over the entire training dataset during all intermediate
steps of the training process. The verifiably robust training can
efficiently minimize the verifiable robust loss as long as it is
guided with sound over-approximation of robustness violations
over a representative subset of the training data. Therefore,
we use random subsampling to pick a representative subset
of training data and use sound over-approximation process
to estimate robustness violations over this subset. This step
significantly speeds up the training process.
Stochastic robust approximation randomly samples k
training data points as Dk from D0, i.e., n training data
points. We find that the verifiable robust loss values computed
over Dk are representative of the verifiable robust loss values
computed over the entire training dataset D0.
Formally, let the Dk denote the representative k data
samples out of the entire training set D0. Then, the new inner
maximization problem for stochastic robust approximation
can be defined as:
max
x˜∈B(x)
E
(x,y)∼Dk
L(d(x), y) (8)
To test the effectiveness of subsampling to estimate robust
loss over the entire training dataset, we randomly subsamples
1,000 data points (k = 1, 000) out of 50,000 in CIFAR
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Fig. 5: The distributions of verifiable robust loss from the entire
training set D0 and from the sampled training set Dk (k=1000)
are very similar.
training dataset. We compute the verifiable robust loss (i.e.,
estimated verifiable robustness violations) over both the
subsampled data points and the entire training dataset. Figure
5 clearly shows that the distribution of verifiable robust
loss Dk over the sub-sampled set is very close to the loss
distribution over the entire training dataset D0. The two
distributions significantly overlap and the verifiable robust
loss values are between 0 to 2 for most of the data points.
Figure 5 clearly demonstrates that we can accurately
estimate the verifiable robust loss values by computing sound
over-approximation of the robustness vioaltions over a ran-
domly subsampled training dataset. This significantly reduces
the time and memory requirements for MixTrain. For instance,
by sampling k = 1, 000 training data points out of 50, 000,
the computational cost of verifiably robust training gets down
to 2% of the original cost using the entire training set.
Such finding is not surprising given that stochastic sampling
is a common technique used in Machine Learning [35]. As
we discussed in Section II, all training procedures for
neural networks use sampling to perform the Empirical Risk
Minimization (ERM) process for estimating the loss values
over the underlying true distribution. Specifically, the n data
points in the training dataset are assumed to be sampled from
the underlying distribution D and are treated as an empirical
distribution D0. Stochastic robust approximation simply
takes such procedures one step further by subsampling the
empirical distribution D0 for computing verifiable robust loss.
Integration with batch training. We further utilize the ran-
domness in the batch generation process to integrate stochastic
robust approximation with batch training that is commonly
used for neural networks. Essentially, we pick k samples
from different batches. Let m and n denote the batch size and
the number of original training data points. Here, the training
process will use nm batches. By distributing k random samples
over these batches, we get k′ = kn/m samples per batch.
Before updating the weights of the neural network for each
batch through back propagation, we compute the estimated
verifiable robust loss from k′ random samples within the batch.
For instance, in Figure 5, given batch size m = 50 and training
dataset size n = 50, 000, randomly sampling k = 1, 000
from the training set is equivalent to randomly picking
k′ = 1 per batch. Our experimental results in Section V
shows that setting k′ = 1 achieves high VRA while running
up to 14× faster than the state-of-the-art verifiably robust
training schemes [19]. stochastic robust approximation can be
customized by changing the value of k as a hyperparameter.
C. Dynamic Mixed Training
Our second technique solves the conflict between the test
accuracy and the verifiable robustness. Most state-of-the-art
robust training schemes struggle to efficiently achieve both
high test accuracy and high verifiable robustness [22], [17],
[19]. To simultaneously increase both the test accuracy and
the verifiable robustness, we dynamically balance the goals
of training for each epoch using a dynamic loss function.
Specifically, we define our dynamic loss function as the
following:
Lmixed = (1−α) E
(x,y)∼D0
L(fθ(x), y)+α E
(x,y)∼Dk
L(d(x), y)
(9)
Lmixed is a weighted sum of the expectation of both the
regular loss E(x,y)∼D0 L(fθ(x), y) and the verifiable robust
loss E(x,y)∼Dk L(d(x), y). The hyperparameter α, which
takes a value between 0 and 1, biases the dynamic loss value
towards either regular loss or verifiably robust loss. When
α is large, the training process tends to find the weights θ
that minimize the verifiable robust loss, increasing VRA. In
contrast, if α is small, Eqn. 9 emphasizes more on the regular
loss and thus enhances the test accuracy.
Dynamic Loss. We dynamically adjust α per epoch to
prioritize different emphasis on the regular loss and the
verifiably robust loss. The dynamic loss function allows
us to adaptively maximize the test accuracy and VRA
simultaneously based on the the current test accuracy. It can
balance the gradients generated from the loss of both the
regular and the verifiably robust training tasks. Therefore,
we can avoid the training being completely dominated by the
one with a larger gradient. Using dynamic loss, we are able
to robustly train the networks that have up to 13.2% higher
test accuracy compared to the state-of-the-art verifiable robust
training schemes [19] with similar VRA (Section V). Besides
the test accuracy improvement, another significant benefit of
MixTrain is that it helps convergence of the training process
especially when either the regular loss or verifiable robust
loss functions are difficult to optimize by themselves.
In our experiments, we use a specific α function as defined
in Section V-B. In general, α can be any reasonably smooth
function. For example, grid search can be used to find the
best α for each epoch. Alternatively, the best α for different
epochs and different networks can potentially be policies
learned using reinforcement learning techniques. We leave
exploring these directions as future work.
V. EVALUATION
We implemented stochastic robust approximation and
dynamic mixed training as part of MixTrain, built on
PyTorch 0.4.02. In MixTrain, we used symbolic linear
relaxation as the sound over-approximation method proposed
by Wang et al. [15]. In this section, we evaluate MixTrain
on 6 different networks trained over 3 different datasets and
compare MixTrain’s performance against 4 state-of-the-art
verifiably and adversarially robust training methods. We
compare these robust training techniques against MixTrain
using three metrics: test accuracy (ACC), estimated robust
accuracy under PGD attacks (ERA), and verified robust
accuracy (VRA). Unless otherwise specified, we use ERA to
denote the robust accuracy as measured with PGD attacks for
the rest of the paper. We summarize our main results below:
1) Compared to the state-of-the-art adversarially robust
training methods [20], [21] that have zero VRA,
MixTrain can obtain up to 95.2% VRA with similar
ERA(PGD) and ACC, using 3 times less training time
on average.
2) Compared to state-of-the-art verifiably robust training
methods [19], [17], MixTrain can achieve up to 13.2%
higher ACC and 6.5% higher VRA, allowing verifiably
robust networks to be trained for real-world applications
.
3) MixTrain requires, on average, 10 times less training
time compared to state-of-the-art verifiably robust
training schemes [19] and thus can easily scale to
large network trained on the ImageNet-200 dataset. For
such large network, MixTrain outperforms the existing
verifiably robust training methods by up to 14.3% VRA
within 12-hour of training time.
A. Experimental Setup
Network Type # hidden units # parameters
MNIST Small Conv 4,804 166,406
MNIST large Conv 28,064 1,974,762
CIFAR Small Conv 6,244 214,918
CIFAR Large Conv 62,464 2,466,858
CIFAR Resnet Residual 31,720 1,145,410
ImageNet Resnet Residual 172,544 2,310,664
TABLE II: Architectures of the 6 neural networks used for
evaluating MixTrain.
Datasets & networks. We evaluate MixTrain on three
different datasets: MNIST digit classification [36], CIFAR10
image classification [37] and ImageNet-2003 [38]. We use
six different network architectures for the experiments. The
details of the networks are shown in Table II. We refer the
interested readers to Appendix B for further details.
Unless otherwise specified, similar to Wong et al. [19],
we train 60 epochs in total with batch size of 50 for all
experiments. We follow the standard normalization procedures
2https://pytorch.org/
3Imagenet-200 is a subset of the ImageNet dataset with 200 classes instead
of 1,000. Also, each piece of training data is cropped to be 3×64×64.
(described below before training for all of the datasets [19],
[22], [20], [21]. For the MNIST dataset, we scale the
inputs to be within [0, 1] with µ = 0.5. We use the Adam
optimizer [39] with learning rate 0.001 and decay it by a
factor of 0.6 for every 5 epochs. We use  starting from 0.01 to
the values used for measuring VRA over the first 10 epochs4.
Similarly, for the CIFAR dataset, we normalize inputs with
µ = [0.485, 0.456, 0.406], σ = [0.225, 0.225, 0.225]. We use
the SGD optimizer [40], [41] with learning rate 0.05 and
decay it by 0.6 for every 5 epochs. We use  starting from
0.001 to values used for measuring VRA over the first 10
epochs. We use the same configurations for ImageNet-200
dataset too. All of our experiments are ran on a GeForce GTX
1080 Ti. For all networks trained using the same dataset, we
use the configurations as well as the same randomly selected
set of test images to compute ACC, ERA, and VRA.
Dynamic α function of MixTrain. We used the following α
function for MixTrain’s dynamic loss function:
αt =

α0, if t = 0
αt−1 + 0.05, if acc > acc0
αt−1 − 0.05, if acc ≤ acc0
Here acc denotes the accuracy of a sub-sampled training
dataset for the current epoch t. acc0 and α0 denote the
desired accuracy and the initial α value, respectively. In
this conditional function, α takes an initial value of α0 at
the beginning (i.e., t = 0) of the batch training process.
Afterwards, for each epoch, α changes according to the
accuracy of current epoch. When the test accuracy increases
and becomes larger than targeted acc0, we increase α by
0.05. Similarly, if the test accuracy decreases and becomes
less than acc0, we deduct 0.05 from the current value of α.
Since the MNIST networks, unlike the other networks we
tested, can be easily trained to have high test accuracy, we
want MixTrain to spend more effort on improving verifiable
robustness in dynamic mixed training. Therefore, we set α0
to be 0.8. By contrast, for CIFAR networks, where achieving
high accuracy is hard, we set α0 to 0.5.
B. MixTrain vs. state-of-the-art training schemes
For each network architecture in Table II, we compared
the performance of MixTrain with existing state-of-the-art
schemes: two adversarially robust training schemes by Madry
et al. [20] and Sinha et al. [21] and two verifiably robust
training schemes by Wong et al. [19] and Mirman et al.
(DIFFAI) [17].
For the two adversarially robust training schemes, we
used the same adversary configurations and training process
from Madry et al. [20]. For the two verifiably robust training
schemes, we picked the experimental setup that achieved the
best results as described in the corresponding paper. Wong et
al.’s method [19] is the state-of-the-art at supporting verifiable
robustness, i.e., VRA. We used 50 random projections for
4Since sound over-approximations over a network during the early stages
of training is more expensive than later stages, decaying  is necessary to
bootstrap the training process.
Network Epsilon Method Batch Time (s) Training Time ACC (%) ERA (%) VRA (%)
MNIST Small
0.1
Regular training 0.006 7m12s 98.6 0.8 0
Madry et al. [20] 0.027 32m4s 99.1 96.0 0
Sinha et al. [21] 0.026 31m12s 98.7 58.5 0
MixTrain 0.011 13m12s 98.5 96.3 91.6
0.3
Madry et al. [20] 0.027 32m24s 98.8 89.3 0
Sinha et al. [21] 0.026 31m12s 98.9 0 0
MixTrain 0.011 13m48s 95.4 87.3 52
MNIST Large
0.1
Regular training 0.007 8m24s 99.3 26.8 0
Madry et al. [20] 0.063 1h15m 98.9 96.7 0
Sinha et al. [21] 0.063 1h16m 99.0 70.1 0
MixTrain 0.051 1h1m 99.5 98.2 95.2
0.3
Madry et al. [20] 0.063 1h15m Does not converge
Sinha et al. [21] 0.066 1h19m 99.1 0.1 0
MixTrain 0.054 1h5m 96.6 89.4 58.4
CIFAR Small 0.0348
Regular training 0.011 10m57s 77.3 18.6 0
Madry et al. [20] 0.194 3h15m 71.2 54.3 0
Sinha et al. [21] 0.192 3h11m 71.8 11.3 0
MixTrain 0.015 14m52s 71.1 54.6 37.6
CIFAR Large 0.0348
Regular training 0.012 12m3s 86.4 14.3 0
Madry et al. [20] 0.289 4h49m 80.9 63.6 0
Sinha et al. [21] 0.204 3h24m 75.1 13.7 0
MixTrain 0.239 3h59m 77.9 63.5 41.6
CIFAR Resnet 0.0348
Regular training 0.014 14m39s 84.2 22.6 0
Madry et al. [20] 0.306 5h6m Does not converge
Sinha et al. [21] 0.212 3h32m 77.3 17.7 0
MixTrain 0.109 1h49m 77.5 61.0 35.5
TABLE III: Comparison between MixTrain and existing state-of-the-art adversarially robust training methods. The best robust
training numbers are shown in bold. Compared to the adversarially robust trained networks, after training 60 epochs, MixTrain
with k=1 can provide similar test accuracy and ERA with up to 95.2% more verifiable robustness within shorter training time.
Wong et al.’s method [19]. Similarly, we use training with
box domains and testing with a hybrid Zonotope domain
with transformer method hSwitch for DIFFAI [17] since this
achieved the best results.
Comparison with Adversarially Robust Training. In
Table III, we have shown the training results of different
techniques for the five tested networks. The best training
time and VRA are highlighted for each network. Here, k of
stochastic robust approximation is set to be 1 to maximize
the training process’s efficiency.
When training the MNIST Large network with  = 0.3
and CIFAR Resnet, Madry et al.’s method [20] does not
converge. We cannot find a feasible choice of learning rate
(lr = 10−7, 3× 10−7, 10−6, ..., 10) that can train the network
to have over 30% test accuracy.
As shown by the results in Table III, MixTrain obtain the
highest VRA for all networks. Madry et al.’s method [20] is
efficient but it cannot provide any verifiable robustness, i.e.,
has zero VRA. By contrast, MixTrain can get VRA as high as
95.2% while still being faster than Madry’s method achieving
same ACC and ERA. Such improvement in verifiable
robustness is highly significant especially for security-sensitive
applications. The training schemes of Sinha et al. [21] can
reach higher ERA scores when  = 0.1 compared to  = 0.3
for MNIST networks. However, on CIFAR networks, it
performed much worse in terms of ERA than MixTrain and
Madry et al.’s method [20]. This is consistent with the results
reported in [21] as the distributional robustness works well
for only very small  values. Note that MixTrain is faster
than the other two adversarially robust training schemes on
all networks except CIFAR Large. Sinha et al.’s method [21]
is slightly faster than MixTrain on CIFAR Large, but we
have significantly higher ACC, ERA, and VRA scores.
Comparison with Verifiably Robust Training. In Table IV,
we compared the performance of MixTrain against verifiably
robust training methods within 12-hours training time. Despite
high VRA, currently the best verifiably robust trained networks
provided by Wong et al. [19] still suffer from scalability issues
and low test accuracy. Table IV clearly demonstrates that
stochastic robust approximation and dynamic mixed training
are two very powerful methods that allow us to scale to large
networks and balance the VRA and test accuracy. Note that
the results for DIFFAI on MNIST dataset are lower than the
numbers reported in [17] mainly because their input normal-
ization have a different scale (e.g., their  = 0.3 only maps
to L∞ norm of 25 out of 255 before normalization while our
 = 0.3 maps to L∞ = 76). Though DIFFAI with box domains
are efficient to train, our experiments show that they tend to
introduce large overestimation errors. Therefore, VRA of DIF-
FAI is low for most of the networks. Moreover, DIFFAI does
not converge on MNIST Large and CIFAR Large networks.
While running stochastic robust approximation on small
networks (MNIST Small, CIFAR Small), we set k to be
20 to compute the verifiable robust loss without increasing
the training cost too much. For the larger networks like
CIFAR Resnet and CIFAR Large, we pick k = 10. Note
that we can make k larger to further improve the VRA by
spending more training time. For MNIST Large, we find that
Network  Method Batch Time (s) Training Time ACC (%) ERA (%) VRA (%)
MNIST Small
0.1
DIFFAI [17] 0.013 12h 97.8 93.1 60.6
Wong et al. [19] 0.078 12h 98.6 96.9 95.7
MixTrain 0.026 12h 99.5 98.0 97.1
0.3
DIFFAI [17] 0.012 12h 98.2 82.9 0
Wong et al. [19] 0.079 12h 91.2 83.1 57.8
MixTrain 0.028 12h 94.0 86.1 60.1
MNIST Large
0.1
DIFFAI [17] 0.022 12h Does not converge
Wong et al. [19] 0.687 12h 99.2 98.3 96.4
MixTrain 0.051 12h 99.5 98.2 95.2
0.3
DIFFAI [17] 0.023 12h Does not converge
Wong et al. [19] 0.689 12h 86.6 71.7 53.1
MixTrain 0.054 12h 96.6 89.4 58.4
CIFAR Small 0.0348
DIFFAI [17] 0.015 12h 66.3 41.9 4.0
Wong et al. [19] 0.248 12h 62.5 52.3 47.5
MixTrain 0.087 12h 69.4 56.5 48.2
CIFAR Large 0.0348
DIFFAI [17] 0.025 12h Does not converge
Wong et al. [19] 2.157 12h 61.9 56.4 49.4
MixTrain 0.268 12h 74.1 62.7 50.2
CIFAR Resnet 0.0348
DIFFAI [17] 0.035 12h 75.6 35.8 0.0
Wong et al. [19] 1.914 12h 58.1 51.7 43.9
MixTrain 0.281 12h 71.3 60.5 50.4
TABLE IV: Comparison between state-of-the-art verifiably robust training methods and MixTrain. The best numbers are shown
in bold. With 12 hours of training time, compared to the verifiably robust trained networks, MixTrain can achieve up to 13.2%
ACC improvements and 6.5% VRA improvements.
Network  Method TrainingTime
Others
MixTrain
ACC
(%)
MNIST
Small
0.1
DIFFAI [17] >24h >36× N/A
Wong et al. [19] >24h >36× N/A
MixTrain 39m26s - 99.5
0.3
DIFFAI [17] >24h >28× N/A
Wong et al. [19] >24h >28× N/A
MixTrain 50m12s - 94.0
MNIST
Large
0.1
DIFFAI [17] >24h >26× N/A
Wong et al. [19] 3h59m 4× 98.9
MixTrain 55m12s - 99.5
0.3
DIFFAI [17] >24h >24× N/A
Wong et al. [19] >24h >24× N/A
MixTrain 58m35s - 96.6
CIFAR
Small 0.0348
DIFFAI [17] >24h >16× N/A
Wong et al. [19] 3h35m 3× 61.3
MixTrain 1h25m - 69.4
CIFAR
Large 0.0348
DIFFAI [17] >24h >5× N/A
Wong et al. [19] 13h14m 3× 64.9
MixTrain (k=10) 4h28m - 74.1
CIFAR
Resnet 0.0348
DIFFAI [17] >24h >5× N/A
Wong et al. [19] 15h53m 3× 60.2
MixTrain 4h36m - 71.3
TABLE V: The shortest training time needed by different
verifiable robust training schemes to achieve the same VRA
as what MixTrain achieved in Table IV, along with the
corresponding test accuracy.
k = 1 is enough to outperform the existing state-of-the-art.
For all networks, within 12-hour training time,MixTrain
achieved higher ACC and VRA than DIFFAI and Wong et
al.’s method . In particular, we have achieve 4.2% higher
VRA and 9.2% higher ACC than the best reported number
of Wong et al. [19] for the MNIST Large network ( = 0.3).
Time to Achieve Target VRA. We test whether other
verifiably robust training methods can reach the same VRA
as MixTrain if we allow more training time. We set the
training time threshold to be 24 hours and set the target
VRA for all verifiably robust training methods to be those
achieved by MixTrain in Table IV. The results are shown in
Table V. MixTrain, on average, is 15× faster than Wong et
al.’s method [19] and at least 20× faster than DIFFAI for
reaching the same target VRA.
Results for ImageNet-200. All existing verifiably robust
training methods have so far been only evaluated on the
MNIST and CIFAR dataset. Since the training cost of
verifiably robust networks increase drastically for large
datasets like ImageNet [42], [43]) and thus training networks
with significant verifiable robustness is very hard. We
evaluate MixTrain with ImageNet Resnet trained on the
Imagenet-200 [38] dataset and show that MixTrain can scale
to such large networks. We use robustness regions bounded
by L∞ ≤ 0.0075. We set k=5 and train the networks for
12 hours. As shown in Table VI, MixTrain outperforms the
state-of-the-art verifiable robust training methods by up to
11.8% test accuracy and 14.4% verified robust accuracy.
Method Batch Time (s) ACC (%) VRA (%)
Regular training 0.022 36.2 0
Wong et al. [19] 3.392 14.4 5.1
MixTrain 0.396 26.2 19.4
TABLE VI: The test accuracy (ACC) and verified robust
accuracy (VRA) of ImageNet Resnet network trained with 12
hours using the ImageNet-200 dataset with  ≤ 0.007.
5the same robustness region is used in [17] for the CIFAR dataset.
C. Robustness for different L∞ bounds
We examine the VRA and ERA metrics with different
robustness regions in the CIFAR Large and MNIST Large
networks trained with MixTrain. The CIFAR Large network
and MNIST Large are trained with L∞ ≤ 0.0348 and
L∞ ≤ 0.3, respectively. Figure 6 shows that these two
networks have high VRA and ERA scores within large L∞
bounds. Overall, the ERA values are higher than VRA. For
MNIST Large, the VRA score is still over 80% when  is
0.25. Similarly for CIFAR Large, the VRA score is higher
than 60% when  is 0.025. Note that the verifiable robustness
of MNIST Large decreases faster than CIFAR Large’s, since
the training range L∞ ≤ 0.3 is relative large that covers
almost all visually undetectable perturbations.
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Fig. 6: Changes of ERA and VRA in different  regions
of MNIST Large and CIFAR Large networks trained with
MixTrain.
D. MixTrain vs. state-of-the-art attacks
We show in Table VII that MixTrain can effectively defend
against the state-of-the-art attacks including PGD, CW and
interval attacks. For the same configurations of attacks, the
interval attacks can find up to 1.4× as many violations as
PGD/CW attacks on adversarially robust trained networks as
shown in Table I. However, such advantage in success rate
decreases to be less than 1% on the networks trained with Mix-
Train. It indicates that, compared to Madry et al.’s method [20],
MixTrain increases the verifiable robustness of networks to
make them more robust and reliable under unknown attacks.
Network ACC(%)
ERA
(PGD) (%)
ERA
(CW)(%)
ERA
(IA)∗(%)
VRA
(%)
MNIST Small 95.4 87.3 87.2 86.7 52.0
MNIST Large 96.6 89.4 90.0 88.6 58.4
CIFAR Small 71.1 54.6 53.9 53.1 37.6
CIFAR Large 77.9 63.5 62.8 62.2 41.6
CIFAR Resnet 77.5 61.0 60.4 59.6 35.2
* Estimated robust accuracy under interval attacks.
TABLE VII: ERA of networks trained with MixTrain under
different attacks ( is 0.3 for MNIST and 0.0348 for CIFAR).
E. MixTrain against L0 and L2 bounded attacks
Using L∞-bound for verifiably robust training, MixTrain
can also make networks robust against L0 and L2-bounded
attacks. Schott et al. [32] have shown that Madry et al.’s
method [20] is not robust against other types of attacks
like L0 and L2-bounded attacks. In Figure 7, we measure
the ERA under state-of-the-art L2-bounded CW attacks and
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Fig. 7: ERA of CIFAR Large networks trained with MixTrain
vs Madry et al. [20], under L2-bounded CW attacks and
L0-bounded pointwise attacks. As additional benefits, the
networks trained with MixTrain are much more robust against
L0 and L2 adversaries.
L0-bounded decision-based pointwise attacks [32], [44] on
CIFAR Large networks trained with MixTrain. We compare
the differences of the ERA obtained through MixTrain against
the networks trained from Madry et al.’s method [20]. For
L2-bounded CW attacks, as shown in Figure 7a, the ERA of
adversarially robust trained network quickly decreases to 0%
when L2 = 2, whereas MixTrain can retain over 60% ERA.
For L0-bounded pointwise attacks, as shown in Figure 7b,
ERA of the network trained with MixTrain stays over 50% at
 = 250 while Madry et al.’s number drops to 0%. The results
demonstrate that the networks trained with MixTrain are much
more robust against L0 and L2 adversaries as side benefits
of MixTrain under L∞-bounded sound over-approximations.
F. Different values of sampling rate k
We evaluate different choices of k in stochastic robust
approximation over the resulting accuracy metrics and training
time in Table VIII. Larger k values can increase ERA and
VRA scores at the cost of more training time. In particular, we
train the CIFAR Small networks with MixTrain on one GPU.
When k = 1, the network achieves 71.1% test accuracy and
decent VRA (37.6%), with very efficient training time. There-
fore, k = 1 is a good choice to save training time/memory. On
the other hand, if more training time is available, one can use
larger sampling rate k to obtain higher VRA. For instance,
with k = 20, MixTrain can train a robust network with a
high VRA (45.4% vs 47.5%) and a significantly higher test
accuracy (70.7% vs 61.1%) compared to the state-of-the-art
method by Wong et al. [19]. Also, it only takes MixTrain 2
hours and 42 minutes to train whereas existing verifiable robust
training techniques need over 11 hours to reach the same VRA.
Batch
Time (s)
Training
Time ACC (%) ERA (%) VRA (%)
k=1 0.015 14m52s 71.1 54.6 37.6
k=5 0.042 45m23s 70.7 54.9 39.9
k=10 0.078 1h18m 69.7 55.2 43.2
k=20 0.162 2h42m 70.7 56.7 45.4
TABLE VIII: Under different values of sampling rate k
for stochastic robust approximation, the comparisons of
corresponding training time, ACC, ERA, and VRA on
CIFAR Small networks.
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Fig. 8: ACC, ERA, and VRA of CIFAR Small networks trained
with MixTrain under different fixed α values in dynamic mixed
training.
G. Different values of α
Influence of different α values. We measure how ACC,
ERA, and VRA change with different fixed α values used
for training the CIFAR Small network. Specifically, we use
different constant values α = 0.0, 0.1, ..., 1.0 to evaluate
the corresponding metrics of each network trained with
k = 1. Figure 8 shows that as α increases, both ERA and
VRA increase but test accuracy decreases. If α = 0, the
training process is the same as regular training, which has the
highest ACC but 0% VRA. By contrast, if α = 1, MixTrain
only relies on stochastic robust approximation and loses the
ACC improvement provided by dynamic mixed training.
Overall, by adjusting α, MixTrain can be tuned to balance
the verifiable robustness and test accuracy as desired.
Dynamic update of α. Instead of using a fixed α value in
training, dynamically changing α can achieve higher ERA
and VRA. In Table IX, we compare the results achieved
by dynamic α with those by a fixed α. First, we train with
a fixed α = 0.5 that balances between ACC and VRA of
the network. Next, we adaptively update α as described in
Section V-A and compare the resulting ACC, ERA, and VRA
metrics. As shown in Table IX, the network trained with
dynamic α outperforms the network trained under fixed α
mechanisms by 6.7% VRA while achieving similar ACC.
CIFAR Small ACC (%) ERA (%) VRA (%)
Fixed α = 0.5 71.4 53.2 30.9
Adaptive α 71.7 54.6 37.6
TABLE IX: Performance of CIFAR Small networks trained
with dynamically adapted α vs fixed α.
VI. RELATED WORK
Recent works have shown that the state-of-the art neural
networks can be easily fooled with adversarially crafted
human-imperceptible perturbations on valid inputs [14], [1],
[28], [13]. The proposed defenses can be categorized into
two classes—best-effort defenses and principled defenses
satisfying some security properties.
Best-effort defenses. Defenses of this class usually rely on
heuristics without supporting any clear security guarantees
about the robustness of the underlying network to adversarial
inputs [45], [9], [10], [46], [47], [31], [48], [49], [50], [51].
Therefore, these defenses have been followed by a sequence
of stronger attacks breaking them in quick succession [52],
[14], [53], [54], [13], [55], [56], [12], [57], [58], [59], [60],
[61], [62]. We refer the interested readers to the survey by
Athalye et al. [31] for more details.
Principled defenses. Adversarially robust training and
verifiably robust training are the two main classes of
principled defenses. Adversarially robust training uses various
different existing attacks [28], [27], [29], [30], [56], [20] to
make the trained network robust. Overall, they are robust
against existing attacks [20], but can still be defeated by
smarter attackers as shown in this paper.
Verifiably robust training can provide sound estimates
of the robustness of the trained network. They use sound
over-approximation of violations to guide the training
process. The underlying techniques for soundly measuring
robustness include basic linear programming [63], SMT
solvers [8], [64], [65], MILP solvers [66], [67], [68],
semidefinite relaxations [69], symbolic intervals [7], [15],
convex polytopes [18], abstract domains [16], Lagrangian
relaxations [33] and Lipschitz continuity [70], [34]. To
increase the efficiency of the training process, verifiably robust
training often has to make some sacrifice in the soundness of
the robustness estimates [22], [17]. Currently, the state of the
art, leveraging random projections to save computations [19],
is still hundreds of times slower than regular training.
MixTrain speeds up the verifiably robust training by on
average 15 times with up to 13.2% test accuracy improvement.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed, implemented, and evaluated
stochastic robust approximation and dynamic mixed training
as part of MixTrain for making verifiably robust training
of neural networks an order of magnitude faster. Our
extensive experimental results demonstrated that MixTrain
outperforms the state-of-the-art verifiably robust training
methods achieving 13.2% improvement in test accuracy and
up to 6.5% higher verified robust accuracy while taking 36×
less training time and 50× less memory. MixTrain even
takes up to 2x less training time than the state-of-the-art
adversarially robust training methods that cannot provide
any verified robustness accuracy. We further presented a
new first-order attack, the interval attack, that shows the
fundamental limitations of adversarially robust training [20].
By contrast, MixTrain provides strong security any L-p-norm
bounded attacks including interval attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Memory Usage
MixTrain is able to significantly cut down memory usage
during robust training compared to state-of-the-art verifiable
robust training [19]. This allows MixTrain to run on limited
GPU resources. Here, in Table X, we summarize the GPU
memory required for regular training, MixTrain and Wong et
al. [19] for each network.  is set to 0.3 for MNIST dataset
and 0.0348 for CIFAR dataset. For Wong et al.’s mehtod [19],
even after applying 50 random projection proposed in [19]
to cut down memory usage, it still needs 4 GeForce GTX
1080 Ti GPUs to train large networks with batch size 50.
In contrast, MixTrain requires only 1 GPU to train these
networks. Overall, MixTrain, on average, uses 10× less GPU
memory than Wong et al.’s method. Note that, as shown in
Table IV and V, MixTrain further provides similar or even
better accuracy and robustness in less training time compared
to Wong et al.’s method [19].
Network Memory Usage (MB)Baseline MixTrain Wong et al. [19]
MNIST Small 533 837 5,474
MNIST Large 629 6,383 32,626
CIFAR Small 553 869 17,960
CIFAR Large 621 5,335 39,840
CIFAR Resnet 589 3,475 3,7784
TABLE X: The GPU memory usage required to train different
networks by using MixTrain compared to regular training (Base-
line) and state-of-the-art verifiable robust training method [19].
 is 0.3 for MNIST dataset and 0.0348 for CIFAR dataset.
B. Network Architectures
Below we describe the architectures of the 6 different
networks we used for our evaluation. We use ConvsC×W×H
to denote a convolutional layer that has C channels with kernel
size (W,H) and stride s. FC n denotes a fully connected
layer that contains n hidden nodes and Res C × W × H
denotes the residual modules defined in [71] that has C output
channels with kernel size (W,H). Each residual module
contains two convolutional layers each with ReLU and one
skip connection from input.
MNIST FC1. Small fully connected network for MNIST:
x→ FC 512→ ReLU → FC 512→ ReLU → fθ(x)
MNIST FC2. Large fully connected network for MNIST:
x→ FC 2048→ ReLU → FC 2048→ ReLU
→ FC 2048→ ReLU → FC 2048→ ReLU
→ FC 2048→ ReLU → fθ(x)
MNIST Small & CIFAR Small. Small convolutional
network for MNIST and CIFAR used in [18]:
x→ Conv216× 4× 4→ ReLU → Conv232× 4× 4
→ ReLU → FC 100→ ReLU → fθ(x)
MNIST Large & CIFAR Large. Large convolutional
networks that are the extensions of small convolutional ones:
x→ Conv132× 3× 3→ ReLU → Conv232× 4× 4
→ ReLU → Conv164× 3× 3→ ReLU
→ Conv264× 4× 4→ ReLU → FC 512
→ ReLU → FC 512→ ReLU → fθ(x)
CIFAR Resnet. The residual networks use the same in [71]:
x→ Conv116× 3× 3→ ReLU → Res 16× 3× 3
→ Res 32× 3× 3→ Res 32× 3× 3
→ Res 64× 3× 3→ Res 64× 3× 3
→ FC 1000→ ReLU → fθ(x)
ImageNet Resnet. The residual networks use the same struc-
ture as in [71] for Imagenet-200 dataset [38]. To improve train-
ing efficiency, we crop the original shape of image 3×64×64
to 3×32×32. Such data augmentation help to speed up the
the training procedure without sacrificing too much accuracy.
x→ Conv116× 3× 3→ ReLU → Res 16× 3× 3
→ Res 32× 3× 3→ Res 32× 3× 3
→ Res 64× 3× 3→ Res 64× 3× 3
→ FC 1000→ ReLU → fθ(x)
